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Abstract: This paper goes beyond commonly invoked macro-political explanations 
for conflict-related migration, offering a micro-analysis of the causes and processes of 
flight from Mogadishu in the last two years. It explores how particular interactions 
between people, their resources, and their structural contexts produce migration, and 
shape the process of migration. Based on qualitative research with people from 
Mogadishu seeking refuge in self-declared Somaliland, the paper illuminates some of 
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Violent mass conflict disrupts the lives of millions of people around the world each 
year. Analysis and conflict resolution and prevention programmes are commonly 
driven by regional, national and international perspectives. But to understand some 
violent conflict situations, and to design successful policies to prevent or respond, it is 
important to go beyond the macro-level, to explore the micro-foundations – the 
individual, household and group interactions leading to and resulting from conflicts 
(MICROCON 2006). This is perhaps particularly important in the context of 
protracted crises, where there are often complex and rather localised conflict 
dynamics.  
 
Migration is a common result of violent conflict, with people moving within the 
affected area or country, and across borders to neighbouring countries or further 
afield. This paper focuses on the causes and processes of migration in the Somali 
regions of the Horn of Africa, which have witnessed particularly dramatic patterns of 
movement. The field research focused on a particular fragment of the wider picture, 
through research with a small sample of people from south-central Somalia (mainly 
Mogadishu) seeking refuge in Somaliland (mainly Hargeisa). The analysis seeks to 
explore people’s often deeply personal accounts of life in conflict and the causes and 
processes of their migration, while at the same time locating these micro-level 
realities in the context of the wider local, national, regional and global political 
economies in which they occur.  
 
The Somali territories cover a large part of the Horn of Africa, reaching into present 
day Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. The Republic of Somalia has effectively split into 
three main parts. In the north west Somali regions, the Republic of Somaliland was 
established in 1991. It has remained largely peaceful since 1997, with large-scale 
refugee repatriation, and hosts people seeking refuge from the southern Somali 
regions and the Somali region of Ethiopia, and labour migrants from elsewhere in the 
Horn of Africa and further afield. The northeastern regional state of Puntland, 
established in 1998, is relatively stable and has seen some post-conflict 
reconstruction, limited return migration, and the arrival of displaced people from 




major transit point for Africans seeking a passage to Yemen and onward. In the war-
torn south-central regions, the ousting of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) by Ethiopian 
and Transitional Federal Government forces has not brought peace, with remnants of 
the ICU mounting a vigorous insurgency campaign. Fighting in Mogadishu displaced 
over 870,000 people in since January 2007 (some two thirds of the city’s population), 
and 1.1 million people are internally displaced with in south-central Somalia (NGO 
statement 2008). 
 
There are important reasons for studying migration in the Somali regions. The 
protracted nature of the civil war has led to displacement on a massive scale, and the 
recent intensification of violence in the south-central regions between the ‘national’ 
government and the Islamic Courts has led to a significant acceleration of movement, 
suggesting that south-central Somalia is likely to continue to generate significant and 
complex migration patterns in the short and medium term future. What are the causes 
of this massive movement and how can they be addressed? How should the urgent 
humanitarian challenges this raises be tackled?  
 
This research focused on two conceptual and empirical challenges. First, there has 
been somewhat of a tendency, understandable amidst the human devastation provoked 
by violent mass conflict, towards accepting macro-political explanations of the causes 
of migration – anyone leaving a conflict-affected area might be presumed to be 
leaving because of the conflict. But as both growing research on livelihoods in 
conflict situations and historical observation of the Somali case suggest, migration is 
in fact one of several strategies that people use to survive and cope during times of 
relative stability as well as conflict. Micro-level research allows us to explore in detail 
how particular interactions between people, their resources, and their structural 
contexts produce migration.  For example, on one level, the question of why people 
have been leaving Mogadishu since 2006 has an obvious answer. But on another 
level, many of the people we spoke with had lived their entire lives in one of the most 
insecure urban environments in the world, finding ways to negotiate daily dangers. 
They are witnesses to the last two decades of insecurity, but their voices are rarely 
heard. To understand the massive recent exodus, we have to listen to how the conflict 





The second conceptual and empirical challenge that this research attempted to address 
was the process of migration – what happens between the decision to leave and 
someone settling somewhere else. This is often overlooked in studies of migration, 
including forced migration, because it is seen as an in-between stage. But the Somali 
case illustrates very clearly that how people move from decision to actual departure, 
how they chart and navigate routes through war-torn and politically troubled 
territories, and their experiences on the road, are not only the a rich subject for 
empirical enquiry, but are also of wider conceptual significance. That it is not possible 
for the vast majority of young people in Mogadishu to go to Canada and become a 
doctor, despite such dreams and aspirations being endemic, is due to a range of 
intervening factors that shape the process of migration and help us to explain its 
eventual outcomes.  
 
Before outlining the research methods, the next section explores key conceptual issues 
regarding migration dynamics in contexts of conflict. 
 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: MIGRATION IN CONTEXTS OF 
CONFLICT 
Migration theories have generally developed to explain people migrating to seek 
better economic opportunities,
3 with fewer attempts to theorise migration associated 
with violent conflict in the country of origin. There is a tendency for scholars to stop 
at macro-level explanations of the causes of ‘forced migration’: there was a conflict in 
the area, so people fled. Indeed, refugee movements are often seen as singular and 
unpredictable occurrences in contrast to labour migration which is seen to be 
governed by social forces that are somewhat regular and amenable to theoretical 
analysis (Zolberg et al. 1989). Much attention has been paid to the causes of conflict 
and its processes, on one hand, and on the other hand, to the impact of conflict-related 
migration on the lives of the people involved and the new environments in which they 
find themselves. But the interface between conflict and migratory processes has been 
                                                       
 
3 See neoclassical push-pull explanations (e.g. Todaro 1969), the ‘new economics of labour migration’ 
household-oriented model (e.g. Stark and Bloom 1985), dual labour market theory focusing on host 
country demand (e.g. Piore 1979), historico-structural explanations (e.g. Sassen 1988) and migration 




less closely scrutinised. This may be in part because we are so used to treating 
conflict-affected countries and forced migration as exceptional phenomena, as 
separate cases from so-called ‘normal’ developing countries or ‘mainstream’ 
economic migration – despite the fact that refugees currently represent some 12 per 
cent of international migrants (UNHCR 2008). The few sociological attempts to 
theorise the causes of migration in contexts of conflict have emphasised two main 
issues.  
 
First, there has been close attention to the interplay between structure and agency. 
Zolberg  et al. (1989) focused on the concept of migration in response to life-
threatening violence, i.e. life including biological existence and social existence (and 
basic material and organizational conditions necessary to maintain them), and clear 
and immediate physical violence (and coercive circumstances with similarly 
threatening effects), and thus emphasising the structural contexts that force migration. 
In contrast, Richmond (1994) drew on Giddens’ structuration theory - emphasising 
the duality of social structure as at once making social action possible, and at the same 
time being created by social action
4  - to develop a model of international population 
movements ranging from reactive to proactive migration. Building on this, Van Hear 
(1998) represents migration as different spatial movements along a force-choice 
continuum, suggesting that migration is determined by a combination of ‘root causes’ 
or structural factors which predispose a population to migrate (e.g. macroeconomic 
disparities between home and host countries); proximate causes or factors that bear 
more immediately on migration (e.g. economic downturn); precipitating factors, 
which trigger decision to depart (e.g. factory closure); and intervening factors, which 
enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate, or consolidate migration (e.g. transport 
networks and immigration regimes). These models, in using the idea of a continuum, 
tend to deconstruct the common dichotomy between ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ 
migration in favour of a more nuanced and gradated conception of the factors that 
limit choice. Turton (2003) however suggests that even the notion of a continuum 
fails to really capture the role of human agency and the variable dynamics of how 
individuals, families and groups respond to such predicaments as purposive actors. He 
                                                       
 
4 Contrasting with structural analysis (which emphasises the structure of social relations) and 
methodological individualism (claiming that only individuals and their psychological predispositions 




points out that even in the most constrained of circumstances, people exercise agency 
and struggle to maintain some area of individual decision making. 
 
A second theme in the critical literature has been the intertwining of political and 
economic elements in the causes of migration in contexts of conflict. This complexity 
is often crudely reduced in the popular tendency to associate forced migration with 
political motives and voluntary migration with economic motives, fuelled by the 
emphasis on civil and political rights in the influential 1951 Refugee Convention 
(Hayden 2006). In fact, of course, the forces behind migration very often have both 
economic and political dimensions. At the macro-level, the political and economic 
elements of instability are often closely interwoven, and at the micro-level, threats to 
lives and livelihoods are closely related (Castles and Van Hear 2005, Lautze 1997). 
The relationship between conflict and migration has also been tested using 
econometric approaches in several macro-level cross-country studies, which overall, 
emphasise the role of political violence and civil war as the main reasons why people 
flee (Schmeidl 1997; Moore and Shellman 2004). However, recent microeconomic 
analysis of data from Aceh and Nepal demonstrate that socio-economic factors - the 
nature of production in the area, the household’s possession of location-specific non-
saleable assets versus saleable assets, the existence of various types of community 
organisations – can also contribute to determining out-migration from conflict 
affected areas, Czaika and Kis-Katos 2007, Engel and Ibañez 2007, and Williams 
2008a and b). All this points to the need for a more ‘social-ecological’ approach 
(Williams 2008b: 33) to understanding migration in contexts of conflict, taking into 
account physical security, but also economic social and psychological well-being. 
 
How can we capture this interplay between structure and agency, and the political and 
economic dimensions of life in research on migration in contexts of conflict? 
Everything points to the usefulness of a micro-level approach. There has long been 
recognition that while it is important to develop a broad macro-level understanding of 
the nature of violent disorder in the contemporary world, there is also a clear need for 
fine-grained case studies of conflict as experienced by families and communities 
(Richards 1996). In the absence of detailed contextual analysis of the micro-

















Source: Lautze and Raven Roberts 2006. 
resolve conflicts often gets ahead of understanding, sometimes with disastrous results 
(Goodhand 2000).  
 
Recent work on livelihoods in conflict situations provides a promising conceptual 
approach and methodology for considering the dynamics of conflict-related migration, 
acknowledging both people’s agency and the importance of broader structural factors. 
In brief, livelihoods analysis, initially used in poor rural settings, focuses on the 
capabilities and resources people possess (‘natural, physical, human, social and 
financial assets’) and how these are mobilised, and mediated by the wider governance 
environment (‘policies, institutions and processes’ such as social relations, informal 
and formal institutions and organisations), to formulate a means of living. This is 
represented diagrammatically in Figure 2 (see also Chambers and Conway 1992; 







Early work on livelihoods in crisis- and conflict-affected settings was mainly carried 
out by applied organisations seeking to target relief, and some of it was criticised for 
being too micro-level and neglecting the wider context. Conflict researchers have 
emphasised the importance of a political economy-informed analysis, which 
emphasises the distribution of power and wealth and how these relationships change 
over time, and brings to light how conflict transforms (rather than simply destroying) 
society, causing people to adapt behaviour and livelihoods to survive, cope or 
sometimes even thrive in conflict-affected areas (Collinson 2003, Longley and 




livelihood systems are both the target of violence  aswell as fundamental to shaping 
the production of social change and violence. 
 
Fine-grained case studies of migration dynamics in conflict settings are few and far 
between (rare examples are Young 2006 and Lubkemann 2008), as conflict 
researchers often do not follow the pathways of people moving out of the conflict 
situation, and forced migration researchers tend to focus rather on the post-migration 
situation of affected people. But a political economy-informed livelihoods lens can 
also be used to analyse the causes and processes of migration in conflict settings 
(Collinson 2007). Migration may be a side effect of a conflict, or the result of 
deliberate war strategies aimed at displacing people or undermining the self-
sufficiency and productivity of particular groups (Lautze 1997). As in peaceful 
contexts, migration might be expected to reflect and in turn affect patterns of 
inequality and power relations in the place of origin. At a broader level, Castles 
(2003) emphasises the importance of not treating forced migration as a string of 
unconnected emergencies but seeing it in the context of wider processes of global 
change and North-South relationships. Understanding how people try to find a means 
of living in the context of wider policies, institutions and processes that constrain and 
enable their actions provides crucial insights into displacement dynamics. How do the 
external (underlying, proximate, precipitating or intervening) factors prompting 
migration interact with the agency of the people involved (expressed through a 
livelihoods lens as their capabilities and resources)? 
 
This analysis can also be extended to consider the process of migration, which has 
often been overlooked, because it is seen as an in-between phase. But journeys – what 
happens between deciding to leave and arrival elsewhere - can be a particularly 
important part of the story in several ways. First, how people begin their journeys is 
part of understanding the causes of migration – even after having made (in principle) 
a decision to move, people will not necessarily find it easy to migrate, and may find 
that intervening factors will facilitate or constrain their intended movement. 
Moreover, while more ‘anticipatory’ movement may be carefully planned as Kunz 
points out, when the journey begins in a more precipitous fashion, decisions regarding 
initial or secondary destinations are often made after people have already hit the road. 




mobilise in different ways to survive and negotiate the distance to a place of safety. 
Second, the wider structural environment enables and constrains mobility in particular 
ways. The geography of conflict, as well as immigration and refugee regimes can 
shape migration pathways, often complicating migration. Migration antecedents – 
tried and tested mobility strategies, well-worn labour or refugee migration pathways, 
diasporic geography and contacts – can influence migration pathways in important 
ways (Van Hear 1998). Third, the process of migration can condition settlement 
processes. People sometimes experience hardship, danger and trauma on the journey 
that adds further weight to their decision to leave and seek safety elsewhere, and can 
become an important aspect of their fear of return. The collective journey can become 
an important aspect of identity in exile. It is important to remember that for many 
conflict-affected people, despite apparently having settled elsewhere, their journey is 
not yet over in their heads. Many long for an eventual return. Others, particularly 
those living in camps hoping for resettlement, see their present residence as a stopping 
point on the way to a better place (Horst 2006).  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
In light of the considerations outlined above, the research sought to answer two main 
questions: 
 
Why are people leaving Mogadishu and other parts of south-central Somalia? 
What are the underlying structural factors, proximate, precipitating and intervening 
factors? What is the role of local/international governance mechanisms in causing 
migration? 
 
How does migration occur? What choices are available, to whom, at what stages? 
What kinds of journeys do people make? How is movement governed by 
local/international actors?  
 
This paper is based on qualitative research carried out in Somaliland in June-August 
2008 (following a preliminary visit in December 2007), mainly in Hargeisa, the main 
destination, with visits to Burco, Berbera and Wajaale. The research was carried out 




who participated in a three-day training and were closely supervised during the 
fieldwork. The research used four main methods:  
 
Individual interviews - 21 people (13 women and 8 men), mainly from Mogadishu, 
participated in the individual interviews. There were identified via research assistants’ 
personal social networks, or by meeting in the street, public transport or workplaces. 
Of relevance to this paper, the participants were asked about: 
•  the general economic, social and political situation in Mogadishu and major 
changes in the last 5 years 
•  their own life situation in the last 5 years, including any changes 
•  how they came to the decision to leave 
•  their journey and any challenges that they met on the way 
 
Focus groups - 17 south-central Somalis (10 women and 7 men) participated in 4 
focus groups, organised with the help of local organisations supporting migrants, 
street contacts, and the research assistants’ social contacts. Generally the focus groups 
were facilitated by one research assistant and another was responsible for tape-
recording and note-taking. Refreshments and bus fares were provided. The focus 
groups discussed with participants similar issues to those addressed in the interviews, 
although in more general terms. Most interviews and focus groups were tape recorded 
and translated and transcribed into English, although a few (where the participant 
preferred) were recorded in hand-written notes. The data was coded and analysed 
using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software.  
 
More information about research participants, the ethical principles guiding the 
research and various issues that arose during the fieldwork, is given in the Appendix. 
In recruiting research participants, we were not seeking a representative sample of 
people from Mogadishu in Hargeisa, but rather a broad balance in terms of gender, 
age and previous socio-economic situation. Around three fifths were woman and two 
fifths were men and most were in their teens, twenties or thirties. As we shall see, 
their economic situation in Mogadishu ranged from among the poorest to very 
prosperous. We also spoke with people of a range of Hawiye sub-clans, including 





5 It is important to acknowledge that those participating in this research 
in Hargeisa represent a small sub-group of all those leaving Mogadishu, but by 
including a people of a broad range of demographic, economic and clan 
characteristics in the research, and combining with analysis and information from 
other secondary and primary sources (see below), it is possible to deduce some key 
aspects of out-migration dynamics from Mogadishu.
6  
 
Consultations - People with particular knowledge of different aspects of migration 
and related processes, including government officials, international agencies, local 
and international development NGOs assisting migrants in Somaliland, and private 
sector entrepreneurs (including money transfer, airlines, lodges and hotels), were 
consulted in person and by telephone and email. Representatives of more than 30 
relevant organisations were consulted. 
 
Analysis of Population Movement Tracking data – in mid-2006, this system was 
set up by UNHCR in collaboration with local NGOs, to provide information on 
population movements within the Somali regions. Local NGOs were identified, 
trained and supported by UNHCR to monitor key locations, including settlements of 
internally displaced people (IDPs), bus stations, and crossroads. Monitors report on 
IDP movements on a daily basis using a standard form, and the data is consolidated at 
local and UNHCR level into a central database. The system cannot provide reliable 
total numbers of internally displaced people in any one location, but it does provide 




                                                       
 
5 Although we did not ask people their clan as this was seen as a sensitive question, in some cases the 
participants offered the information and in others the research assistants knew or had some idea of their 
clan. 
6 Due to security problems, there has been no comprehensive survey of Mogadishu residents and their 
migration patterns, or of displaced populations, which means that quantitative analysis of the 
determinants of emigration is not currently possible. 
7 Some may have moved before the system was set up; some may have simply disappeared into the 
community and not been recorded by the PMT monitors; and some may have subsequently moved on 




STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENT: CHANGING LANDSCAPES OF 
VIOLENCE AND THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE WAR ON TERROR  
This section documents underlying structural changes in Mogadishu and participants’ 
observations regarding the changing landscapes of violence during the civil war, 
while following sections explore how people reach the decision to migrate and the 
process of migration. The broad political economy might be seen as laying the 
groundwork for migration, impinging on different people’s lives in different ways.  
 
Most research participants had remained in south-central Somalia throughout this 
period, and were asked about how the general situation in Mogadishu had changed in 
the last five years. They all spoke of two main shifts, firstly with the rise of the 
Islamic Courts, and secondly with their overthrow and the arrival of the TFG, backed 
by Ethiopian troops. We will start the story, however, somewhat earlier, because it is 
important to view the violence of the last two years in a historical perspective, 
particularly as this is sometimes overlooked in the international community’s 
responses to the Somali situation, which recently have been heavily framed by the 
need to respond to urgent humanitarian challenges and the geopolitics of the ‘war on 
terror’. A historical perspective is also important to demonstrate how migration has 
always been an aspect of Somali society - from the age-old and enduring mobility of 
the nomadic pastoralists, to jet-age asylum-seekers and transnational entrepreneurs – 
and to show continuities and changes over time. 
State-building and collapse 
Traditionally stateless, Somalis are an ethnic group - defined in terms of shared 
language, religion and socio-political organization through clanship - but have never 
formed a single polity (Lewis 2002). Somali people are concentrated in an area in the 
Horn of Africa that stretches from the far north east corner into modern day Djibouti, 
the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northern Kenya, and have a strong and enduring 
tradition of nomadic pastoral migration. Arab and Somali regional migration brought 
Islam and linkages into wider trading networks. In the 1800s and early 1990s, Britain, 
Italy, Ethiopian and France brought various parts of the Somali regions under colonial 
rule, complicating later attempts at state-building. The Republic of Somalia was 
created in 1960 from the union of the Italian-administrated UN Trusteeship to the 




decade the civilian government remained heavily reliant on budgetary support from 
other countries, with growing public discontent at visible corruption and the over-
centralisation of power on the southern capital, Mogadishu (Lewis 2002). Like many 
post-colonial capitals, there were high levels of urbanisation in the early post-
independence period. 
 
General Mohamed Siyad Barre came to power in a coup d’état in 1969, expounding 
‘scientific socialism’, and launched a central economic planning process. Despite 
some early successes, Cold War patronage - first Soviet then later American – fuelled 
domestic clientelism underneath the regime’s nationalist rhetoric (Samatar 1988). As 
Barre consolidated power around the Marehan, Ogaden and Dublahante branches of 
the Darod family, rebel movements formed in response to discontent and repression of 
Majerteen communities in the north east (Somali Salvation Democratic Front, 1979) 
and Isaq communities in the north west (Somali National Movement, 1981). 
Following attempts at liberal reforms in the 1980s, the Somali state sank into 
economic and political crisis, with little control of the shrinking formal economy, 
dwindling aid, and costly counterinsurgency operations in the north west. Under 
Barre, the major migration patterns were the movement of Somali workers to the oil-
rich Gulf states, and the arrival of well over half a million Somali refugees from the 
Ethiopian Ogaden region in the late 1970s (Jamal 1988, Kibreab 2004, Brons 2001). 
 
Civil war broke out in 1988, with the government responding to cross-border SNM 
attacks with savage reprisals against Isaq civilians in the the north west, destroying 
Hargeisa and Burao by aerial bombardment, killing more than 50,000 people. In 1989, 
the United Somali Congress (Hawiye based) and the Somali Patriotic Movement 
(Ogaden based) were established and in January 1991, the USC ousted Barre from 
Mogadishu and appointed an interim government. The insurgent groups failed to 
agree on the formation of a new government, leading to devastating violence and 
political fragmentation.  
Civil war in Mogadishu 
In the early 1990s, in Mogadishu and elsewhere, opposing militia looted homes and 
businesses, robbed, kidnapped, raped and killed people associated by clan with 




famine in 1991-92 and was the scene of flailing humanitarian efforts and a 
catastrophic UN intervention in 1993 by US and other forces (de Waal 1997). Borders 
proliferated within the Somali Republic after the collapse of the state, constraining 
travel by land through the territories governed by competing factions.  
 
The southern and central areas were controlled for much of the 1990s and first half of 
the 2000s by multiple non-state actors - warlord and factional rule drawing on clan-
based military support, and later on councils of elders, municipal administrations and 
Islamist groups also came to control parts of the territory. Localised systems of 
governance have, in some places and at some points in time, provided a surprising 
degree of stability, despite the absence of the state:  
 
Notwithstanding the general perception of Somalia as “anarchic”, basic law 
and order is in fact the norm in most locations… much of the Somali 
countryside - especially Somaliland, Puntland, and pockets of southern 
Somalia - is safer for local residents than is the case in neighbouring countries. 
There are, to be sure, shifting zones of very dangerous banditry and 
criminality in places like Jowhar, the lower Jubba valley, and parts of 
Mogadishu. It is also true that both Somali nationals and foreigners associated 
with an international organization or a profitable business are frequent targets 
of kidnapping for ransom, especially in Mogadishu. But it is important not to 
confuse the security problems of international aid agencies with security 
problems for average residents. (Menkhaus 2000: 9)  
 
Analysis of the cross-border livestock trade, Mogadishu’s trade economy, the banana 
trade, and the expansion of telecommunications demonstrates that the economy has 
provided relatively buoyant in some ways, particularly in Mogadishu (Little 2003, 
Marchal 2000 and 2002, Hansen 2007, World Bank 2005, Websersik 2005). Many 
commentators ironically describe the civil war as a radical structural adjustment 
programme: it liberalised foreign trade, freed exchange rates, eliminated subsidies, 
deregulated national markets, drastically downsized the public sector and privatised 
parastatals. The private sector’s successes in this environment for some time seemed 





The above aspects of political order and economic opportunity lead to what Little 
(2003) called the ‘dilemma of representation’ regarding Somalia during this period. It 
translated into the incongruous outcome that despite witnessing some of the more 
devastating violence and direst economic hardship experienced in the contemporary 
world, ‘some parts of Somali society enjoy better human security today than they did 
in the Barre era, despite state collapse.’ (Samatar 1994: 8). It has led some 
commentators to wonder whether these half-statuses (the not peace/not war situation 
in many areas, the not official/not unofficial economy) are be more than a transitory 
stage but rather the defining characteristics of the contemporary era in Mogadishu and 
the Somali regions (Little 2003, Hagmaan and Von Hoehne 2008, Bradbury 2008). 
Rather than being a ‘complex political emergency’ on the way to state reconstruction, 
the Somali regions may be an example instead of non-state but nevertheless durable 
‘emerging political complexes’ that so confound peace and development specialists 
(Duffield 2001). 
 
Since 1991, Somalia has witnessed diverse migration patterns. Nomads have 
continued their cycles of pastoral migration, adapting to changing ecological and 
political circumstances. People have moved short distances within and between cities 
and rural homelands, or from more troubled to quieter regions, to escape violence. 
People have also fled to neighbouring countries, forming a large regional diaspora, 
both encamped and self-settled in urban areas, and some formed sizeable refugee 
communities in Western Europe and North America. Some have returned to the more 
stable self-declared Republic of Somaliland and to a lesser extent to the autonomous 
regions of Puntland. Meanwhile, emigration from across the Somali regions continues 
in response to insecurity, chronic political uncertainty, and limited economic 
opportunities. The first mass displacement was to Ethiopia and Djibouti as a result of 
the war in the north-west in 1988-1991. There was a second massive population 
movement in the wake of escalating violence in the southern areas and the collapse of 
the state in 1991, with hundreds of thousands of people fleeing to Kenya and Ethiopia.  
 
Participants described the period in Mogadishu before the rise of the Islamic Courts as 
characterised by generalised insecurity, but with somewhat predictable elements. This 
in part explains why the official recorded refugee population reached a peak of over 




with the viewpoint expressed that: 'Although there was a civil war in the country, it 
was nothing like what we are facing currently.’
8 Participants spoke of warlords and 
the division of Mogadishu into clan territories, and sporadic fighting between these 
factions: 
 
Sometimes I wanted to visit my relatives and could not go because there were 
warlords everywhere. Every clan had its place. If you enter another clan’s area 
then they might kill or kidnap you... Sometimes the fighting only lasted ten or 
fifteen minutes, because the fighting wasn’t heavy at that time...
9 
 
However, as the statement above also indicates, participants broadly saw these 
dangers as negotiable, by avoiding by avoiding particular areas, and being aware of 
what was going on. More emphasis was laid, instead, on the problems of general 
lawlessness and crime, and economic challenges. Particular mention was made of the 
problem of the mooryan (a derogatory term referring to armed groups of young men 
prone to criminal predation on civilian population). They complained about the 
frequently high cost of water and other basic goods during their period. Yet, at the 
same time, they emphasised how life went on – as one NGO worker put it: 'Life in 
Mogadishu is time bomb, you are always worrying that sometime or another it will 
explode. It is the poor who suffer the most, but no one seems to notice that, and 
everyone just goes about their everyday life.'
10 
 
As this quote also suggests, people’s experiences of this period varied considerably 
depending on their position in society, and their economic, social and political 
resources. Research participants were drawn from a spectrum of occupations, from 
porters, rubbish collectors, domestic workers, construction workers, tea sellers, 
students, school teachers, shopkeepers, to gold sellers, engineers, money transfer 
workers and traders. While all of the interviewees had found ways to negotiate and 
survive the insecure urban environment of this period, some people clearly fared 
rather better than others. For example, minority groups such as the Somali Bantu were 
particularly vulnerable, without access to strong clan protection: one woman 
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explained 'We owned a small piece of land in Hodan neighborhood and but it doesn’t 
belong to us anymore. It was taken over by a Hawiye family and since we are Bantu 
we can’t go and claim it.'
11 At the other end of the spectrum, some people were clearly 
doing well out of insecurity: as one young woman put it, 'All those warlords, their 
children are in prestigious schools and they are living a luxurious life and they never 
worry about what is happening to the civilians of Somalia, they are so selfish and 
greedy and they only think about themselves.'
12 Less dramatically, several of those 
interviewed were clearly part of Mogadishu’s prosperous Hawiye business class, 
using clan connections and economic muscle to thrive in an otherwise challenging 
context. 
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The rise of the Islamic courts 
The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in Kenya in 2004, the most 
recent of fourteen attempts to re-establish a government since 1991. Formed in exile, 
and intended to be a government of national unity, the TFG finally convened in 
Baidoa in early 2006.  
However, relocation to the capital was prevented by disagreement between the TFG 
and the ‘Mogadishu group’ a powerful alliance of businessmen, faction leaders, clan 
elders from the locally strong Hawiye/Habar Gedir sub-clans (ICG 2008; Menkhaus 
2008). The TFG was hampered by serious internal dissent and defections of 
Mogadishu-based parliamentarians and ministers and its territorial control was limited 
to two provincial towns.  
 
Over the course of a decade or so, configurations of power in Mogadishu had shifted 
considerably, challenging the power of the Hawiye warlords. Popular support for 
factional leaders was weakened by their failure to provide basic services and rule of 
law, and the rise of a powerful business elite able to buy off militia as private security 
forces (ICG 2006). Meanwhile, the long-standing network of sharia courts, grew in 
strength, fuelled by funding from Mogadishu’s business community to resolve 
disputes and deal with chronic lawlessness, providing the basis for a broad based 
Islamist movement known as the Islamic Courts Union, with its own militia (Barnes 
and Hassan 2007).  
 
Amid growing tensions and violence between the Islamists and the warlords in 2006, 
the US government, which had long been trying unsuccessfully to get hold of 
suspected terrorists believed to be hiding with hard-line Islamists, took the 
opportunity to back prominent factional leaders in an ‘Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counter-Terrorism’ (Menkhaus 2008). The Islamists won a decisive victory 
in June 2006, after serious fighting: for the first time since the state had collapsed, the 
capital was ruled by a unified administration, which rapidly expanded its control to 
the border with Puntland in the north and with Kenya in the south (ICG 2006). 
 
Major changes ensued in Mogadishu. Clan militias were disarmed or brought under 




seaports were re-opened for the first time since 1995, and the Courts initiated a 
popular urban clean-up programme. Meanwhile potential critics were intimidated, and 
religiously conservative social policies were imposed in some neighbourhoods by 
local clerics, such as the closure of cinemas, banning of mixed sex social gatherings, 
and outlawing of the stimulant khat (Menkhaus 2007). 
 
Research participants described the period during which Mogadishu was governed by 
the Islamic Courts Union in overwhelmingly positive terms. They emphasised what 
the Islamic Courts proceeded to do in terms of improving the urban environment ‘for 
the people’. First, they began to combat crime and violence in the city: 
 
'When the ICU came into the country they made safety and peace for the 
citizens a priority. They made sure that every robber gave up his gun, all the 
video spots were closed, every khat seller stopped selling poison to the people, 
everything was calm and quiet. And it was really what the people we were 




All this created, participants said - one after another, in elated terms - a sense of 
unusual ‘normality’, a sense that things were how they should be, that there was, at 
last, a government. 
 
The only time we had peace and stability is when the ICU was in control, if 
you saw that period, everything was running the way it was supposed to run, 
and it was six months of heaven and we were really blessed.
14   
 
Good things happened when the ICU took over Somalia and tried their best to 
bring things back to normal… and they succeeded at that and within six 
months you could see the changes and how things were going on flawlessly.
15 
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[When] the ICU came to Mogadishu, we got the relief of peace, a kind of 
peace we never saw since 1990.
16 
 
When I finished school, the ICU were capturing control of Mogadishu, 
clearing the thieves and putting them in jail, just like a government. It was like 




Many participants emphasised the economic impact of the stability achieved. People 
were able to get on with business, at all hours of the day (where previously business 
tended to operate only during daylight hours): 'Economically when the ICU was there, 
at least the business were functioning and running normally and the businesses were 
booming and doing very well, it was stable.’
18  
 
Only two participants expressed reservations about the Islamic Courts during this 
period, complaining that they were not religious in their actions, their provocation of 
Ethiopia got Somalia to its current mess (see below), and that they forcibly recruited 
young men into their militia.
19  
An Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government 
We will never know how the ICU would have governed the southern Somali regions 
given time. Its emergence as a potential precursor of a strong Islamic irredentist state 
in Somalia, combined with increasingly bellicose statements vis-à-vis the Ogaden 
from its more hardline wing (led by Hassan Dahir Aweys) alarmed the Ethiopian 
government; Western governments generally did not want to see a strong Islamist 
state in Somalia; the US government’s frustration about what it saw as the ICU’s non-
cooperation over terrorist suspects mounted (Menkhaus 2008). In December 2006, at 
the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government, and with US diplomatic 
support, Ethiopian troops mounted an offensive against the Islamic Courts which 
succeeded in dislodging their forces from Mogadishu. Many of its leaders and fighters 
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fled south or abroad. The TFG, with help from the UN, particularly UNDP, began 
attempts to establish government offices and institutions.  
 
But it did not take long for opposition to rally. The opposition that emerged was not 
one organisation, but a range of fragmented groups coalescing around Hawiye clan 
militia, ICU militia, and the hardline jihadist Al-Shabaab group (ICG 2008). 
Opposition factions carried out numerous and damaging attacks on TFG and 
Ethiopian installations in Mogadishu and elsewhere and the civilian neighbourhoods 
surrounding them; murdered and threatened aid workers, civil society leaders, and 
ordinary people they claim were acting in ways complicit with the TFG, including by 
trying to prevent opposition groups from launching attacks from their neighbourhood 
that would incite reprisals against civilians; and organised a series of suicide 
bombings in Puntland and Somaliland in October 2008 (HRW 2008, AI 2008a). They 
recruited through a mixture of persuasion, cash offerings and intimidation (ICG 2008, 
HRW 2008). 
 
Numerous sources now document that the TFG and its Ethiopian allies responded to 
opposition attacks in ways that have caused severe suffering to civilians, deeply 
alienating many residents of Mogadishu (AI 2008a, ICG 2008,  Menkhaus 2008, 
HRW 2007 and 2008). By the end of 2007 government sources said that 80 per cent 
of the country was still outside government control (BBC 2007). At the end of 2008, 
all the major towns in south-central Somalia were controlled by various fragments of 
the insurgency, except Mogadishu (where there were also parts effectively off limits 
to TFG forces and their Ethiopian allies) and Baidoa (ICG 2008). 
 
Research participants’ accounts of life in Mogadishu during 2007 and the first half of 
2008 emphasised three key, interlocking structural aspects: life-threatening violence 
and urban insecurity, economic disruption, and geopolitical machinations.  
 
First, they spoke of direct and life-threatening violence and more general urban 
insecurity. The quality of the violence in Mogadishu and its humanitarian 
consequences changed dramatically in the last two years, leading some aid workers to 




Human Rights Watch describes the changed patterns of violence in Mogadishu in the 
last two years:  
 
The bombardments are largely indiscriminate, lobbed into densely populated 
neighbourhoods with no adequate effort made to guide them to their intended 
targets. Insurgents lob mortar shells from populated neighbourhoods that crash 
through the roofs of families living near TFG police stations and Ethiopian 
bases. Ethiopian and TFG forces respond with sustained salvos of mortar, 
artillery, and rocket fire that destroy homes and their inhabitants near the 
launching points of the fast-departed insurgents... TFG security forces and 
militias have terrorized the population by subjecting citizens to murder, rape, 
assault, and looting. Insurgent fighters subject perceived critics of TFG 
collaborators – including people who took menial jobs in TFG offices or sold 
water to Ethiopian soldiers – to death threats and targeted killings. The 
discipline of Ethiopian soldiers in Somalia has broken down to the point where 
they increasingly are responsible for violent criminality. Victims have no way 
to file a complaint – the TFG police force has itself been implicated in many 
of the worst abuses, including the arbitrary arrests of ordinary civilians to 
extort ransom from their families. (HRW 2008: 4) 
 
It seems that a key element is the unpredictability of violence, which makes it hard to 
adapt to or negotiate, and contrasts with earlier years when patterns of violence had 
settled into some regularity. For much of this period, when conflict broke out, people 
knew which areas to avoid, they knew it would be temporary, and they knew where 
they fitted in the power configurations in Mogadishu.  Research participants described 
a dramatic deterioration in civilian security since the arrival of the TFG: many said 
that everything was turned ‘upside down’. Strong themes in their accounts were a 
sense of disorientation at the changing political and geographical configurations of 
power and at the new technologies of war being deployed, and significant urban 
insecurity: 
 
There is a huge problem in Mogadishu and total chaos, everyday there is 




It just looks like a jungle with no law or order. The TFG instead of solving 
problems made everything worse, I really don’t know what is happening.
20 
 
But now nothing is in order if you work or not you will get looted by the TFG 




Life in Somalia was unbearable, there was death on daily basis and we 
couldn’t survive there anymore where there are rockets going over your head, 




Ethiopians set fire to everything they come across or thought that the 
insurgents could hide in - houses, farms, offices, shops and even food stores 
and the animals that belong to the poor nomads.
23  
 
[Ethiopian troops] made problems for women going to other places, for 
example their jewellery and mobiles would be taken by thieves (but they 
would be less likely to rob men). They killed lots of men saying that they 
supported the Islamic Courts. These problems are still continuing.
24 
 
Now you can see small groups being created calling themselves funny names 
and hiding behind a fake story by saying they are going to free the land from 
the foreigners. Is it really what they are doing? Because all I am seeing is 
killings of innocent civilians that had nothing to do with all of this.
25 
 
A second theme in participants’ accounts was the economic disruption caused by the 
violence. Some aspects of this are well-documented by humanitarian relief 
organisations which estimated that within the first six months of 2008, the number of 
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people requiring emergency livelihood and humanitarian support increased by 40 per 
cent, to 35 per cent of the population (Holleman 2008). Around 21 per cent of the 
urban population in south-central Somalia are thought to be facing either acute food 
and livelihood crisis (i.e. highly stressed and critical lack of food access with high and 
above usual malnutrition rates and accelerated depletion of livelihood assets) or 
humanitarian emergency (i.e. severe lack of food access with excess mortality, very 
high and increasing malnutrition, and irreversible asset-stripping) (Holleman 2008). 
This is partly a result of how the violence and civil insecurity has disrupted economic 
activities, trade and transportation networks. Participants described how the changing 
environment hindered economic activity, and their attempts to get on with everyday 
life amidst the turmoil: 
 
For example in a certain day I woke up early, prayed  and got ready for 
schools then  on the way I saw many people killed and so many barriers. 
Sometimes it got worse and the Ethiopians killed people for no reason.
26  
  
I can say that life in Somalia was better when the ICU was in charge. Then, we 
were working freely, no one stole from us or looted us out of our money or 
belongings. Now we have to bribe the government police in order to stay safe 
or not to be searched by the Ethiopian troops. If it happens and they arrest you, 
you have to pay them an amount money - $200 or $300 - and most of us don’t 
even have it. It is just like a jungle with no law or order in place. You have to 
think before you make any move or improvement to your life situation.
27  
 
In addition, the printing of Somali Shillings, largely to fund the conflict, has increased 
the money supply, dramatically decreasing the value of the shilling to the dollar (by 
about 50 per cent in Mogadishu between January and July 2007), resulting in 
hyperinflation, exacerbated by high global food and fuel prices (with reported price 
increases of 200 per cent to 700 per cent in six months) (Holleman 2008). As one 
participant put it:  
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Somalia is not doing well when it comes to economy. Nothing is stable or 
solid, exchange rates fluctuate on a daily basis and the dollar exchange rate is 
high compared to the Somali shilling. The situation is worsening everyday and 
there are no government regulations to maintain or supervise the economy.
28 
 
All in all, participants’ accounts tend to support the analysis that ‘The escalating 
conflict, civil insecurity and instability in Somalia are not only directly leading to 
human suffering... but are fuelling an economic crisis which is beginning to have a 
wider and devastating impact on the broader population.’ (Holleman 2008)  
 
Finally, participants also emphasised the geopolitical drivers of the changes they have 
seen in Mogadishu in recent years. People in Mogadishu are well aware that their city 
has become, more than for many years, a theatre where external actors are also 
playing out their hostilities, as summarised in a recent report by the International 
Crisis Group (ICG 2008). The Ethiopian government wants to destroy the ICU and 
the interest groups on which it draws support, and prevent the rise of a strong central 
or Islamist state that would revive claims on the Somali-inhabited Ethiopian Ogaden 
region and support armed insurgencies in Ethiopia. The US’s priority appeared to be 
to extract suspected terrorists, with secondary aims of preventing the emergence of a 
strong Islamist government, and maintaining strong relations with Ethiopia as a stable 
and reliable regional ally (ICG 2008; Menkhaus 2008). Controversially, US has 
launched military strikes against suspected extremists in Somalia with considerable 
‘collateral damage’ in January 2007 (near Ras Kamboohi, missing the target but 
killing 30 civilians), March 2008 (Dhobley, missing the target and killing four 
civilians) and May 2008 (Dhusamareb, killing Aden Hashi Ayro, a Shabaab leader, 
and 15 others). The Eritrean government continues to support hardline Islamist 
elements in an attempt to undermine its long-standing enemy Ethiopia. The European 
Union has remained focused on humanitarian issues and financial support to the TFG, 
facing criticisms that it has not used its potential leverage to curb excesses emanating 
from parts of the TFG. It is not clear what the impact will be of Saudi Arabia’s recent 
increased engagement with Somalia – $1 bn for reconstruction has been promised, 
                                                       
 




and could wield influence as the home of the Wahabi Islam popular among the radical 
elements of the opposition. Overall:  
 
Key players with strategic involvement in the region like the US and the EU 
failed even to condemn the abuses as they were happening, remarking only on 
obstruction to humanitarian relief. As has been the case for more than a 
decade, the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Somali civilians was met 
with almost total silence. (HRW 2008: 35). 
 
Against this background, a strong theme in participants’ accounts was deep anger at 
the Ethiopian intervention and condemnation of the ignorance, apparent indifference 
or complicity of the international community in the face of the grotesque wrongs they 
had witnessed. For example: 
 
When the ICU left the country, everything collapsed into chaos, you could 
witness a rocket fall on a neighbour’s house leaving no survivors, you could 
see a 13 year old girl admitted to hospital because she had been raped by a 
group of Ethiopian troops and she is suffering major injuries and there is no 
medicine around to help her survive. If you want the truth... Mogadishu isn’t 
the same anymore and it looks like no one who cares what is happening there. 
Maybe because we are Muslims and a lot of things are happening to Muslim 
people around the world and no one cares that this is happening again in a 




In Somalia the international community seems to be enjoying the situation, no 
one is responding, even our Muslim fellows aren’t responding... there are a 
few foreigners that are enjoying our suffering, they can write and document 
things but where is the outcome? Why are we not seeing results? They had 
been saying that the situation is going to get better with the Ethiopian troops 
arriving but it was much better when the Islamic Courts were in charge even if 
                                                       
 




some don’t like to hear it. Everyone knows, the fact is they made massive 
changes that no one else had managed in all those years of civil war.
30 
 
Bringing Ethiopians to Somalia... was adding oil to the fire. As everyone knew 
that Somalis and Ethiopians were never good friends… also the TFG is not 
improving the situation in Somalia... It is the civilians who are really suffering. 
The vulnerable and poor don’t even think to leave the country and at the end 
of the day they are the ones who die with no one caring. There are factsheets 
that state how many people are dying in Somalia and how many till today left 
the country to look for a safer place, knowing that some countries are not 
welcoming them, but who can blame them...
31 
 
Every morning you will hear of stories where the TFG and Ethiopian troops 
had raped this, or looted that, or even slaughtered and killed some. I myself 
witnessed in Baidoa hospital a case of a girl of 15 years old who had been 
raped by a group of Ethiopian troops. The hospital couldn’t heal her and she 
eventually died because of her injuries.
32 
 
The situation provoked young people who split into groups, giving themselves 
fake identities like Al-Shabaab. This brought the eyes of the outside world to 
us, saying that we are one of the biggest countries hosting the terrorist cells, 
bringing outside interference in our affairs, saying that they are helping the 
current Administration to establish itself and gain control in the country.
33 
 
This situation remains unresolved. Exiled ICU leaders established an umbrella group 
with non-Islamist Somalis known as the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia 
(ARS). Led by moderates Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (former ICU) and Sharif 
Hassan (former TFG), the ARS negotiated the Djibouti Agreement with the TFG in 
July 2008, calling for a cessation of hostilities, deployment of a UN peacekeeping 
force, and withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. However, the Djibouti process has stalled 
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due to the refusal by Al-Shabaab and hardliner Eritrea-based ARS members (led by 
Hassan Dahir Aweys) to participate, and the limited control of the more moderate 
ARS wing of the numerous opposition groups in Somalia (Menkhaus 2008). 
Meanwhile, divisions between President Abdullahi Yusuf and his supporters and 
Prime Minister Nur ‘Adde’ Hassan Hussein, reached a climax at the end of 2008, with 
the Darod president dismissing the more moderate Hawiye prime minister and then 
resigning under pressure from Parliament (ICG 2008). Following the resignation of 
Abdullahi Yusuf, former president of the TFG, withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, and 
the inauguration of the moderate Islamic Courts’ leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed 
as president, some of the internally displaced have reportedly returned in 2009 to 
Mogadishu. But the new president will have to navigate complex political challenges 
– including political entrepreneurs, clan tensions, extremist militant groups and 
international pressures – to secure peace in the city. 
 
DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE DISMEMBERING OF DAILY LIFE 
There have been important structural upheavals in Mogadishu and shifting landscapes 
of violence in the last couple of decades, with particularly dramatic changes within 
the last five years. This provides the backdrop to migration, shaping underlying 
predispositions to migrate. Figure 3 suggests that internal population movements in 
the period January 2007 to May 2008, which peaked in March/April 2007 and 
October/November 2007, roughly correlate with bouts of violence in Mogadishu, 
tending to support macro-political explanations of migration.
34 March 2007 marked 
the Ethiopian forces’ first major offensive against opposition strongholds in northern 
Mogadishu, and mid-September marked a renewed bout of ferocious fighting and 
bombardment following an Al Shabaab mortar attack on Mogadishu’s international 
airport and the AMISOM base in Mogadishu, affecting the area around Bakara market 
particularly badly (HRW 2008). More broadly, the official number of registered 
Somali refugees grew by 82,936 in 2007 alone, bringing the total to 422,161 
(UNHCR 2008). 
This macro-political explanation for recent migration is certainly persuasive. 
However, they tell us little about how people came to the decision to leave, or about 
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Figure 3. Arrivals of people from Mogadishu elsewhere in Somalia 


















Source: Population Movement Tracking Data, UNHCR 
their journeys out of Mogadishu. The structural context may impinge on individual’s 
lives in a variety of ways, and incite a variety of responses 
Given the resilience and ability to adapt that has been exhibited by this urban 
population that has weathered nearly two decades of civil war, what was it about the 
last two years that has prompted so many people to leave? How did the structural 
environment described above impinge on the everyday lives of individuals and 
families, and interact with personal capabilities and resources, and how did migration 
come to seem like the optimal response? What were the proximate causes that 
translated wider structural changes into more personal impacts on people’s lives and 
the factors that precipitated the decision to migrate? Participants were asked to 
describe important changes in their lives in the last five years and how they came to 
make the decision to leave. Three main types of changes that might be described as 
proximate causes or precipitating factors - loss of human capabilities, loss of physical 











Human capabilities: family deaths, injuries, arrests and departures 
Human capabilities were defined by early livelihood theorists as what people can do 
or be, and the ability to find and make use of livelihood opportunities and cope with 




capital’ or ‘human assets’ to capture a similar idea, and emphasise the people at a 
household’s disposal as labour resources, as well as their skills, knowledge, ability to 
work, or health. Many research participants’ human capabilities and resources were 
subject to change in ways that had prompted their migration. 
 
Several research participants had lost immediate family members in the violence 
(spouses, parents, siblings, children). Three participants lost most of their family when 
their homes or friends’ homes were hit by mortars or rocket fire. Three participants 
lost family members where they were shot in the street by Ethiopian or government 
troops, or in the crossfire between the opposition and government / Ethiopian forces. 
Two women left following the arrest of male family members in Mogadishu. Three 
female interviewees after their husbands fled Mogadishu separately, leaving them as 
female-headed households. In addition, several participants mentioned assaults or 
health problems sustained by themselves or immediate family members as a result of 
violence – including injuries resulting from beatings, temporary loss of hearing, rape, 
loss of limbs, malaria, and people losing their minds. The rate and types of injuries 
have changed, according to a medic at a Mogadishu hospital:  
 
The injuries and profile of the injured are different from the usual violence in 
Mogadishu, which is usually injuries of individuals from light weapons. 
Different weapons are being used than before. At the hospitals you see injuries 
from tank shells, mortars, Katyusha rockets. It’s urban warfare in the middle 
of the city…You see whole families at the hospitals, because the shells are 
landing on homes. The scenes at the hospital are horrible: children with legs 
and arms amputated, people with intestines coming out and with head injuries. 
(HRW 2008: 41) 
 
Deaths, departures and incapacity of various kinds disrupted the human capabilities of 
the families affected, irredeemably changing the nature of family life. Such changes 
can have a huge emotional, economic and security impact on those left behind. For 
some the death of family members was a proximate cause that set the scene for 
eventual migration, for others it immediately precipitated migration, as for example 






In the final days before departure several young men and women in our sample went 
to great efforts to obtain exam certificates. This did not apparently delay the timing of 
their departure, which was largely a family decision based on other factors, but their 
personal concern and emphasis on this issue in their description of their final days in 
Mogadishu was striking. Like Abdi, many young people derive great pride and 
satisfaction from continuing their education, developing their academic capabilities in 
a challenging context, and have hopes that this investment of money, time and effort 
will serve them in the future. In December, some institutions in Mogadishu brought 
forward exams in anticipation of the conflict, and many students faced an anxious few 
days hoping that they would not have to leave before they were given their certificate, 
precious evidence of their human capital. Hassan (Figure 5) is one such example, and 
his narrow escape is worth relating in some detail because it also illustrates the build 
up of tension and the generalised insecurity on the streets of Mogadishu during this 
period.  
 
Figure 4. Case Study: Abdi 
Abdi’s father was a construction worker and his mother worked washing clothes for the neighbours. He 
finished Koranic school aged 15, towards the end of 2006, when the ICU was still in control. The first day he 
went with his parents to enrol in school, everyone was sent home because the teachers feared that fighting 
was going to break out. The next day there was no fighting, so they went back and he enrolled. While they 
were waiting for the bus home, around midday, fighting broke out in the street, hand grenades and shooting. 
He had hit the floor to avoid the bullets, but his dad was standing in the middle of the road shouting for his 
wife. Abdi found his mother writhing on the ground. She had been shot in the head, he could smell the blood 
and began to vomit. His father was frantic, there was no car to take her to hospital, she was bleeding badly 
and died after fifteen minutes. His father was shouting for help but there was none. The fighting continued 
around them. His father said we’ve got to stay, otherwise the dogs will eat her. A passing ICU technical 
refused to help, saying they were busy trying to clear the area of mooryaan. Around 4pm the fighting stopped 
and a lot of vehicles passed taking injured people to hospital. He went to a substation to call their neighbours 
who came with a car and took them home. The following day his mother was buried. He was awake all night 
crying. As the Ethiopians advanced towards Mogadishu, the principal brought forward their exam. He hardly 
cared when his school closed because was so happy to get his exam certificate. The next day the Ethiopians 
entered Mogadishu. The fighting was heavier than he had ever heard in his life, with different mortars than 
they were used to. They could not sleep. The next day his father went to retrieve some building materials 
from Bakara market, but on the way back Ethiopian troops stopped him, perhaps thinking he had a gun in his 
heavy bag. They shouted at him in their language but he didn’t understand so he kept walking. Then one 
shouted ‘Stop’! He did and a bullet came from somewhere and tore through his thigh. The troops shouted at 
him to go home. He reached the house and but died of the injury soon after. Later Abdi’s uncle explained that 
his father had asked him to look after Abdi and help him finish school, and offered to help him leave 
Mogadishu and go somewhere else - Puntland, Hargeisa or Beled Weyne. He chose Hargeisa. He was glad to 
leave. His uncle took him to the Daallo airline office and got a ticket and passport, and told Abdi he’d 
arranged for a friend to help him in Hargeisa, and to phone if he needed money. He packed his bags, said 
goodbye to the neighbours, and his uncle drove him to the airport. As they waited, he could still hear the 




Physical and financial resources: occupation, confiscation, destruction 
Beyond human capabilities, there are also more concrete resources that are used to 
secure a means of living, both physical (structures, infrastructure and equipment used 
for production, and housing, and domestic tools and stocks) and financial (money – 
from cash on hand, to savings, to other easily marketable stores of value, including 
jewellery, livestock, or even weapons). The way that the conflict impinged on these 
was another major factor driving migration. 
 
Four participants reported that they were forced to leave their homes when they were 
occupied by Ethiopian troops, and two that their homes had been destroyed by mortar. 
Six explicitly mentioned that some or all of their other business or personal property 
had been confiscated by government or Ethiopian troops prior to their departure. 
Many more people mentioned examples of this happening to other people that they 
knew. There were some instances of forced evictions as the TFG conducted 
operations in particular areas (OCHA 2007b).  
 
Figure 5. Case study: Hassan 
Hassan lived with his parents and siblings, and his Dad sold clothes in Bakara market. He had been doing 
some courses in English and Maths after finishing Koranic school. When they heard that the Ethiopian 
troops were close to Mogadishu, his father ignored the news and just got on with his job. His mother, who 
liked to hear what was going on at home and abroad, was glued to the radio. She told him to stop going to 
school because it wasn’t safe, but he was worried he would not get his certificate if he left before the end of 
the course. Fortunately, the principal let him take the exam early and he passed, and they told him to collect 
his certificate on Saturday, ‘But on Wednesday the Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu. I heard guns and 
everything but all I could think about was my certificate and how could I get it. From Wednesday to 
Saturday there was fighting. My mother was saying don’t go anywhere because the police will kill you.’ He 
secretly jumped out of the window and went to his school. Because of the fighting there were no buses so he 
ran there by way of the side streets. On the way he saw a tank in the road and saw Ethiopian troops shooting 
at people... Eventually he reached the school in Towfiiq area. It was closed but the two watchmen there who 
let him in. The Ethiopian troops came closer. A landmine exploded close to the gate of the school, so they 
Ethiopians thought there were ICU militia inside. They came over the walls and shot one of the watchmen. 
Terrified, Hassan ran up to the roof of the school to hide but the troops saw him and shot at him. They 
missed, and he fell to the floor, sweating and thinking that his mother did not know where he was, and no 
one would know if he died there. The troops kicked in the doors to the school and were shooting, looking 
for people, money or documents, setting fire to things. When they left, he and the second watchman who 
had also been hiding covered up the watchman’s body. The other watchman told him not to go anywhere 
until the fighting had finished. But he was thinking of his mother and whether she was alive or dead and 
decided he would go home. He ran out into the street, but one of the Ethiopian troops shot at him so he fell 
to the ground and pretended to be dead. He could see dead people in the street. Another person was lying 
close by and his blood was running towards him - he thinks the troops thought that it was his blood. He 
finally opened his eyes and saw there was no one left, and got up and started running again. He saw other 
people also leaving the area so he walked with them as far as Afgoye. Finally, after a few weeks sleeping 
rough near the bus station, and asking everyone he met from Mogadishu whether they had seen his family, 




Although those who were already poorly off were affected by the confiscation and 
destruction of property, in many ways the better-off made richer pickings for the 
various troops, militia and bandits, neatly illustrating how during conflict what have 
hitherto been livelihood assets can become liabilities (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 
2006). After the political tables turned in Mogadishu in late 2006, many of those who 
had been doing well under the Islamic Courts were brought low. For example, Naema, 
the wife of a Qaadi (judge) in the Islamic Courts led a good life, living with her 
husband and children in a big house which they owned, with several vehicles and 
servants. One day in January 2007, her husband left the house, dressed in the Islamic 
way, and Ethiopian troops shot him in the street.
35 Shortly after, the house was 
occupied by Ethiopian troops, who beat her children and herself badly before 
throwing them out on the street. All their vehicles were taken, some by the 
government and others hit by a mortar. After this one of her children was hit by a 
bullet on the way to school. She fled Mogadishu with the children to seek refuge with 
rural relatives.
36 In this case the family’s links with the ICU made them particularly 
vulnerable. 
 
While many businesspeople had weathered previous crises by shutting up shop and 
staying out of harm’s way, adapting activities, or buying protection, many found that 
the situation in 2007 made it impossible to continue. For example, Khadra, a 
successful shopkeeper in Bakara market lived with mother and her own family, for 
whom she provided, and owned property and several vehicles. When the Ethiopian 
troops came to Mogadishu she moved her family from her neighbourhood to north 
Mogadishu for safety,
37 and later heard that she had lost her business merchandise and 
capital, houses (some demolished in the battles between the opposition and 
TFG/Ethiopian forces, others occupied by Ethiopian troops) and vehicles. She heard 
that the Transitional Government and the Ethiopian troops took them to use as 
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2007), but it is also possible in this case that he was specifically targeted as linked to the Islamic Courts 
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36 Interview 5 (woman in her forties, small trader) 
37 We think that this was because she was from a Hawiye clan strong in north Mogadishu, and this was 








The widespread looting of businesses and other institutions by freelance militia, as 
well as the warring parties, also had a more general effect on market activity. As the 
militia fled, and businesses and institutions like schools and universities closed for 
periods, or definitively, many employees lost income. While Bakara Market, the 
biggest Somali market and the heart of Hawiye economic power, has continued to 
operate, it is in a dangerous area and was frequently been the epicentre of battles 
between the opposition and the TFG (ICG 2008). It seems likely – although difficult 
to state confidently from our interviews – that the disruption to trade routes and 
changing patterns of demand caused by the civil insecurity was a further factor in the 
decisions of some businesspeople to leave Mogadishu.  
Losing socio-political protection: daily danger and impeded livelihoods 
Another theme emerging in participants’ narratives of how they came to decide to 
leave was the loss of socio-political protection. Socio-political assets – which can 
sometimes turn into liabilities, especially in conflict settings - include membership of 
particular groups, access to community decision-making processes, ability to appeal 
to authorities for justice and security, et cetera, that can be used to further one’s 
livelihood strategies. As patterns of power in Mogadishu were contested and 
reconfigured, people who had managed to negotiate the risks of life in Mogadishu 
before and during the Islamic Courts found themselves in new situations which 
required reconfigurations of their livelihood systems in many ways, including by 
adopting migration as a livelihood strategy. 
 
Those witnessing the growing frequency of death and disaster among their 
neighbours, extended family and clan networks, began to fear that the same could 
happen to them if they stayed. This was the case even among those from prosperous 
families that had hitherto led relatively comfortable lives in Mogadishu. For example, 
Fadumo, who had worked for a decade as a successful goldseller, living in 
Wardhigley district, owning several houses and vehicles. Her houses and vehicles 
                                                       
 




were occupied or confiscated by Ethiopian troops. Her husband left for Europe, and 
the last she heard he had reached only as far as Libya. Four cousins and other family 
members were killed in the fighting. Other relatives went on tahrib, others were 
imprisoned by the TFG. After all this she decided to take her children and sister away 
and flew to Hargeisa in October 2007.
39 
 
For women, exposure to increased risk of rape and assault against the background of 
generally increased urban insecurity, often contributed to the decision to depart. For 
some women, membership of particular groups had previously provided a degree of 
protection from rape.  A young woman explained that she, her sisters, and her mother 
left their thriving business primarily out of fear of rape or assault: 
 
We were rich with lands… My father died in 1991 at the start of the civil war, 
and we were four daughters and my mother. My mother had shops and we 
used to help there, we used to go to school and we were really doing well… 
The ICU understood why we should work outside our houses as women. We 
had no men to help us or bring food to our table. And you could travel carefree 
around the city… But after the arrival of the Ethiopians, we couldn’t come out 
of our houses… The shops were taken over the TFG and we couldn’t stay 
there any longer. My mum decided to leave for our sake as girls - we were 
hearing about rapes and how the Ethiopians make excuses to come into your 
house by saying that they are searching for the insurgents and that’s how they 
get into houses of the civilians and they start doing their horrible things - 
raping, killings and slaughtering all that under the name of protecting us from 
the ICU! This a change - at least while we were only Somalis we never 




Suaad, previously a businesswoman in Bakara market in Mogadishu, explained that 
although she had managed to maintain a viable livelihood following her husband’s 
killing in crossfire between the ICU and Ethiopian forces, she felt that she and her son 
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were personally insecure, both as visible minority members and herself also as a 
woman. It was a considered, regretful, organised departure.  
 
I didn’t know what to do but I decided to keep running our business. I am 
considered a minority in Somalia, I am hamar aad. We are successful in 
business but we are an easy target for the Hawiye and the Harti and the 
Ethiopians, who seem to think we are Eritrean, I don’t know what gave them 
that idea...
41 I was managing ok though, I was managing to take care of my son 
and I never went to ask for help from anyone, thank Allah. My family wasn’t 
in Mogadishu – they went to Europe a few years ago. My husband’s family is 
all abroad since the 1990s... and my brothers-in-law sent me a little money to 
help out... But if you can’t go out to look for your daily bread it is a problem, 
if you can’t sleep at night peacefully it’s a problem, if you can’t stop thinking 
of what might happen it’s a problem - so you can see life in Mogadishu is a 
problem.  And isn’t for a day or two, it’s constant, no rest, no day off.  A 
situation that made me ask myself, am I going to make it and see my son grow 
up into a fine man or not?... And as I am hamar aad I kept asking myself am I 
going to get raped or kidnapped by the Ethiopians. This is a change because 
two years ago I wasn’t worrying about my security or safety, and now I have 
to really worry about it seriously. I thank Allah that I didn’t encounter any of 
the problems I feared, and I made it safely to Somaliland. After all I saw, I 
realised I couldn’t go on like that for any more, I decided to leave for a safer 
place for my own and my child’s sake. I had to think about it carefully, I 
didn’t want to take any irrational decisions that I might regret later in life.
42 
 
For some people, the increased urban insecurity impeded their usual livelihood 
strategies. In particular, many participants mentioned how it became much riskier to 
move around the city – affecting everyone from large traders through to low-paid 
casual workers. For example, a former porter in Bakara market explained:  
 
                                                       
 
41 See also other reports of Ethiopian troops mistreating lighter-skinned Somalis, saying that they look 
like Eritreans (HRW 2008: 61). 




I was living well before the Ethiopians came in but now everything is 
chaotic... We used to work late at night at Mogadishu port and we used to 
come back from work on foot to our houses when the ICU was in charge, and 
we never encountered any kind of problems all the way from the port to the 
place I live in. But now I wasn’t even safe during the day, let alone at night. 
You have to be extra cautious of the TFG and Ethiopians on one side and the 
thieves and looters on the other side… I was living in an area called Hamar 
Weyn; I left for my safety… I am my parents’ only son... it was my father and 
mother’s request that I go somewhere safer, they were afraid that something 
might happen to me, like what happened to my other young friends.
43 
 
Another example is the situation of Farhan who said that he used to work collecting 
rubbish from neighbourhood houses for 2000 or 3000 Somali Shillings each time. He 
lived in Towfiq neighbourhood, near the crossroads, which was became a something 
of a flashpoint, with his father, also a rubbish collector and his mother, who worked as 
a cleaner in people’s homes and sometimes as a porter. According to him, both their 
work and social possibilities dramatically contracted with the violence: ‘The problem 
came when the Ethiopian troops arrived. Everything closed. No one was working, no 
one would come to visit you, you couldn’t visit anyone else... My mother began to cry 
when we heard the mortars or the PM because she had a headache and complained she 
couldn’t hear anything...’
44 After the fighting finished and the Ethiopians left they 
departed very quietly on their own, avoiding speaking with any neighbours, taking 
their life savings with them. 
 
Some livelihoods became specifically politically dangerous. Opposition groups began 
to target anyone working for the TFG, even if only as a cleaner, and anyone suspected 
of assisting the government in any way (HRW 2008). NGO workers were particularly 
politically exposed: international aid organisations and their Somali civil society 
partners were targeted by some opposition groups for complicity with Western 
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backing of the TFG and counter-terrorism.
45 But it is often unclear where the threats 
are coming from – often clearly from insurgents, but other times people fear that the 
TFG is trying to silence them, or others are using the opportunity to settle old scores 
(HRW 2008). Two of our interviewees were people who had already lived many years 
in Kenya and Italy, part of the valuable if extremely limited reversal of the brain 
drain, educated people who had bravely returned to work in Somalia. Other NGO 
workers have a wealth of experience and local knowledge. Their frustration at leaving 
projects that may not now be completed was considerable, and the impact of the 
departure of locally respected, and often well-educated and outspoken civil society 
leaders further changes the political economy of Mogadishu. 
 
For some, their migration was clearly prompted by one of the three types of factors 
(loss of human capabilities, physical/financial assets, and socio-political protection). 
But for many, different elements overlapped. As a refugee from Black Sea area 
interviewed by Amnesty International put it, ‘I cannot say in one story why I wasn’t 
safe, there are too many stories.’ (AI 2008a: 10).  
 
It is important to note that many tried for periods to cope with and adapt in various 
ways to the challenges described, before deciding to leave the city: for example, 
according to the information provided by food security monitors, ‘Poor and middling 
households are becoming severely indebted, and are adopting extreme coping 
strategies, including skipping meals, begging, selling productive assets and out-
migration (‘keenan’).’ (Holleman 2008). Local mobility, in particular, was key in 
people’s strategies for trying to cope with the conflict. At the most basic level, people 
tried to avoid being out in the street and avoid areas where there were armed men or 
fighting. However, as house-to-house searches for insurgents, rocket barrages and 
mortar bombardment of their neighbourhoods continued, and as urban guerrillas 
moved in and out of their neighbourhoods, even staying at home was not enough to 
avoid trouble. Several participants relocated within Mogadishu or the surrounding 
area before leaving, initially deploying old strategies of urban mobility to avoid areas 
affected by the violence. As the violence continued throughout the city, however, they 
                                                       
 
45 At least 29 humanitarian workers were killed in January to November 2008, 12 injured, 19 
kidnapped and many more civil society and human rights activists and community leaders were also 




eventually decided to leave. For example, Halima’s family, initially moved from their 
mixed neighbourhood to Xamar Weyne (a Reer Banadir area - her mother was 
Hawiye and her father was from the Reer Banadir minority). Her boss had been killed 
and the internet business where she worked trashed by Ethiopian troops, and her 
University had been closed and the students sent home. When it became clear that the 
situation was not improving, the family bought plane tickets to Somaliland in 
September 2007.
46 Khadra, the shopkeeper mentioned above initially moved her 
family to north Mogadishu away from the Ethiopian and government troops’ 
strongholds, before deciding to move to Somaliland (see also HRW 2008, OCHA 
2007).  
 
The actual or threatened loss of human capabilities, as well as physical and financial 
resources, and socio-political protection, all affected research participants’ livelihoods 
in direct ways that contributed to the decision to move. At the same time the process 
of reaching the decision to leave also points to the agency of those involved, both 
individually and in groups (of family members, neighbours and strangers) and their 
ability to influence their fate, albeit wedged between a rock and a hard place, in trying 
to adapt to the situation in various ways, in deciding (in some cases) when and under 
what conditions to leave, by making efforts to plan their movement ahead of time, and 
deciding where to go. This leads us into the process of migration.  
 
JOURNEYS 
The process of migration from one place to another can be an important part of 
people’s stories, and is too often over-looked, as simply the bit between ‘why people 
left’ and ‘how they settled elsewhere’. Many people affected by conflict decide to 
leave for somewhere safer, but between the decision ‘in principle’ and its realisation 
or outcome lie the matters of actually embarking on the journey, routes taken and 
destination, and experiences on the way. Having made the decision to leave, 
prospective migrants negotiate several types of intervening factors that may enable, 
facilitate, constrain, accelerate, or consolidate migration (following Van Hear 1998). 
In some cases the proximate and precipitating causes of migration overlapped with the 
                                                       
 




intervening factors (for example, someone may decide to leave because of generalised 
insecurity but that may also prevent them moving around the city safely).  
Embarking on the journey 
The time between the decision to leave and departure can be relatively condensed or 
more drawn out. Several participants stressed the people of Mogadishu did not expect 
the ICU, which seemed so strong, to be overcome, and so rapidly, which perhaps 
explains why there was not a massive anticipatory rush to leave. Having said this, as 
reports of the TFG / Ethiopian advance reached Mogadishu, some of our research 
participants had decided to leave if Ethiopian troops entered the city, based on fears of 
what would happen (derived from current political observations and old-timers 
accounts’ of the fierceness of the Ogaden war), and had their decision rapidly 
consolidated by the violence that did in fact ensue. Many, particularly poorer people 
in neighbourhoods badly and suddenly hit by bouts of severe violence, embarked on a 
journey as soon as they had made the decision to leave, some literally running, having 
paused only long enough to get their money, and grab some spare clothes or food – a 
classic precipitous departure (Kunz 1973).  
 
However, some of the participants had decided a few days, weeks or months 
previously that they should leave, but took some time to make their arrangements, out 
of necessity or preference. Some preferred to delay, gambling that (further) calamities 
would not befall them while they organised their departure, winding up their affairs 
(liquidating their assets for example by selling off merchandise; entrusting their 
business to a contact; arranging for relatives to live in their home). Some had a 
problem of involuntary immobility for various reasons. Violence could itself impede 
departure, as areas were locked down by troops for security reasons or searches and 
public transport out of the city dried up (OCHA 2007b). Some people in this position 
were temporarily impeded by outbreaks of violence in their area which meant they 
stayed at home for safety, until there was a moment when they could escape. For 
example, Farhan, the rubbish collector mentioned earlier, said that once his family 
decided that they had to leave Mogadishu, they were initially prevented by a 





We lived in Towfiiq neighbourhood, near to the crossroads, where there were 
Ethiopian troops, and the Islamic Courts were coming in silently to ambush 
them, when we were ready to leave we couldn’t because some really heavy 
fighting began. My mother was in shock and could not speak, I thought she 
was dead, but my father told me she was just unconscious. The fighting came 
very close to us. The Ethiopians were using kaare [tanks], and the floor and 
the house shook every time they hit. We were terrified and we couldn’t leave 
the house. There was no telephone and we did not have a mobile. In between 
the bouts of firing we would open the window and shout to the neighbours to 
find out what was going on... Then the Ethiopian troops started to come into 
people’s homes and if they saw anyone over twenty they would say this one is 
with the Islamic Courts. Even sometimes they would just shoot at people in 
the street if they had a big beard, or had a suno [prayer mark on the forehead] 
saying this one is Al Qaida. They would shoot you or take you away to 
Ethiopia. I saw that with my own eyes.
47 
 
Others simply did not have the money to leave. While the bottom line is that it is 
possible for most people to walk some 30 km to Afgoye, as many residents of 
Mogadishu have indeed done, it was dangerous and as time went it became clear that 
Afgoye itself itself might not be somewhere safe to stay. In order to travel safely to 
Afgoye or contemplate a longer journey, people needed money, and so some stayed to 
beg, borrow or scrape together meagre earnings to finance their journey: 
 
I was brought up in Mogadishu and lived in Hamar Jadiid neighbourhood. I 
left Mogadishu after a rocket fell on my house and killed three of my kids, my 
husband, my brother and my brother in-law… my other two children were 
admitted to the hospital but I couldn’t afford the medicines and the fees so I 
had to take them out. I started begging in Mogadishu but no one had any 
money and I came back empty-handed. It was a hard life and it wasn’t getting 
better with Ethiopians and the TFG around and those small militia that loot the 
money we were making all day long... Two months after the death of my 
children and husband, I decided to leave Mogadishu and go to Beled Weyn… 
                                                       
 




But I couldn’t leave immediately because I couldn’t afford it, and I had two 
injured kids. I had nothing for them at all, no medication, no protection and no 
shelter for them. So I decided to stay a bit longer, to get money... after a while 
when things got heated again I did leave.
48  
 
Given this evidence, it seems likely that some people still in Mogadishu have in 
principle made a decision to leave, but are waiting for a suitable opportunity or 
moment to arise, constrained meanwhile by lack of money or other factors.  
 
Familiarity with potential destinations and social networks also affected the speed 
with which people moved from decision to departure. Most of the research 
participants had lived their whole lives in Mogadishu and the surrounding area and 
just did not know where else they could go where they could find a means of living. 
As a result, several participants returned to Mogadishu after initially leaving, because 
they thought they would be better able to make a living there than elsewhere. One 
focus group participant explained:  
 
At first I left for Afgoye and I stayed there for three months, but I had nothing 
to sleep on, or cook with. So I decided to go back to Mogadishu again and 
found a job as a housekeeper for some people which was good because there 




In contrast, knowing people elsewhere appeared to consolidate the decision to depart, 
also influencing route-making, as we shall see below. Moreover, the departure of 
other people they knew helped to consolidate and accelerate decisions to leave: 
neighbourhoods across Mogadishu gradually became ghost towns as whole 
communities fled – particularly Hodan, Hawal Wadag, Towfiq, Huriwa, Hamar Jadid, 
Wardhigley and Gubta (Doyle 2008; HRW 2008; AI 2008a). For some young people, 
it began to seem that most of their peers had been killed, fled or gone for tahrib to 
Europe or the Middle East. The three Somali NGO workers interviewed had watched 
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colleagues disappear in the face of death threats and assassinations before departing 
themselves.  
Route-making  
The idea of route-making is used here for the process of planning and travelling from 
one place to another. Population Movement Tracking data, combined with insights 
from NGO workers and our research participants, point to several major routes taken 
by those leaving Mogadishu.  
 
Many people initially fled to the areas surrounding Mogadishu. Some sought refuge 
with rural relatives, an age-old pattern for urban Somalis when the going gets tough. 
Large numbers of people initially moved to the Afgoye town, some 30 km away, 
where many remain, living in miserable conditions, left largely to their own devices, 
often subject to extortion and harassment, particularly if they are without clan-based 
protection (AI 2008a, Noor 2007).  
 
Tens of thousands of people fled southwards, with the ICU militia’s retreat in the 
direction of Kenya. Some sought refuge in southern towns, and their clans’ stronghold 
areas. But against the background of on-going turbulence of this area, many tried to 
cross into Kenya. The Kenyan government closed the border in January 2007, based 
on concerns that fleeing ICU fighters and possibly Al Qaida operatives would end up 
in Kenya, jeopardising national security. This meant that people could no longer cross 
at Dhobley to the Liboi transit camp, but had to stay in Somalia or make the 
sometimes dangerous journey through the bush to the Dadaab camps, where they were 
sometimes denied assistance on account of their illegal crossing (AI 2007b). 
Nevertheless, 37,821 new refugees were registered in Kenya in 2007 (UNHCR 2008).  
 
Meanwhile, travelling northwards, many Hawiye headed for their clan homelands, or 
urban centres less affected by violence, like Beled Weyne and Galkayo. Beled Weyne 
is on the road north from Mogadishu to the Ethiopian border, largely populated by 
Hawiye clans, and is an obvious route north and also a strategic location as on the 
supply route for Ethiopian forces. Several of our participants had stayed a few weeks 
or months in Beled Weyn, but moved on when the fighting between the 




what was going on in Mogadishu. Internally displaced people were particularly 
vulnerable. In July 2008 Ethiopian forces withdrew from the town to road, leaving it 
to opposition groups (HRW 2008).  
 
Galkcayo has also received large numbers of IDPs from Mogadishu. Some 
respondents that eventually ended up in Somaliland also stayed some weeks or 
months here. NGOs provided some assistance to the worse-off. But the situation here 
remained tense. Galkcayo is a divided city, where Hawiye sub-clans live uneasily 
alongside the Darod sub-clans which dominate to the north. The security situation in 
Puntland deteriorated since 2006, in part because of the allocation of Puntland troops 
to protect President Abdullahi Yusuf in the south. Moreover, political hostility 
towards the Hawiye clans makes live difficult there for many IDPs.  
 
In this context, many travelled up to Bosaso with the aim of travelling on to Yemen 
on smuggler’s boats. Others travelled to Ethiopia, where Teferi Ber refugee camp was 
re-opened to house the new refugees (nearly 10,000 arrived in 2007, UNHCR 2007b). 
Still others headed for Somaliland. From there, some moved to claim asylum in 
Ethiopia or Djibouti, some crossing to Yemen from Djibouti.  
 
Who took which routes depends on a variety of factors. The varying routes taken by 
our research participants from Mogadishu to Hargeisa, ranging from direct plane 
flights to complex overland journeys, provides some useful insights into the factors 
that shape migration processes in the Somali regions. While some decided to go to 
Hargeisa before leaving home, some decided to go to Somaliland en route, having left 
Mogadishu initially hoping to fund refuge in an intermediate location or undecided 
about where to go, and waited some time for an improvement in the situation before 
moving onwards. Regardless, the overland route most people had travelled to 
Hargeisa was via Afgoye, Beled Weyne, Galkcayo, Las Anod and Burao. Several 
intervening factors shaped their routes.  
 
First, in terms of the wider structural environment, the geography of transport, conflict 
and borders played a key role in shaping routes taken. Most obviously, pathways 
northwards were shaped by where the roads lay, where they could rest, where they 




transport from one major urban centre to another. There are also several companies 
serving the air route between Mogadishu and Hargeisa (although the TFG suspended 
flights in August 2007, temporarily preventing departures).
50 In addition, people’s 
routes were shaped by the political geography of the conflict. While the Somali 
regions have during the civil war seen a proliferation of airlinks and 
telecommunications which facilitate mobility, but at the same time a proliferation of 
borders, as changing constellations of power, including new quasi states, claimed 
territory, complicating the ability of people to move to and seek refuge in other 
Somali territories. The political geography of the conflict was a key reason why many 
people went to Somaliland. The whole of the southern and central zone was affected 
by the conflict, and Puntland was seen as politically hostile to Hawiye clans, 
discouraging many of those fleeing Mogadishu from seeking permanent refuge there. 
Furthermore, news of international border closures, as well as preference for staying 
in Somalia rather than becoming a refugee in a different country, deterred some from 
making for neighbouring Kenya or Ethiopia. One young woman explained that when 
they decided to leave in late 2006, her father phoned some friends and was told that 
the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders was closed, but that the Somaliland border was 




Second, the capabilities and resources of participants were mobilised in different ways 
to reach a place of safety. In terms of human capabilities, familiarity with mobility as 
a livelihood strategy appears to help, as well as general resourcefulness. As outlined 
earlier often tried and tested mobility strategies were deployed within Mogadishu and 
its surrounding areas, as a first step to try to cope with the situation. Travelling further 
afield, familiarity with other Somali towns and in general previous experience of 
travel seemed to help those in flight negotiate unfamiliar settings.  
 
In terms of financial resources, again ready money was an important asset. Many of 
the poorest people found themselves walking large segments of the journey, working 
                                                       
 
50 Due to a row about Somaliland’s threat to jail any Somalilanders applying for the new Somali 
passport (Somaliland Times 2007). Airline and airport officials in Hargeisa report that sometimes 
planes were going back to Mogadishu empty just to fetch out more people, but also report that flight 
have continued to take passengers to Mogadishu, mainly used by people with business to attend to. 




their way from place to place by doing casual jobs, or begging people for funds to 
move onwards. Having a certain amount of cash allowed people to book themselves 
on flights to Somaliland, buy or hire vehicles, or compete in the frantic rushes for bus 
stations and scrambles to hitch a ride on a truck. According to one focus group 
participant: 
 
I came with my kids to here by a truck, the truck owners was asking for 
money, and all I had was 100,000 Somali shillings and a pair of earrings. I 
gave the truck driver what I had and asked him to take us to Bosaso, we went 
through Jowhar then Galkacyo and Bosaso. From Bosaso I begged the drivers 
there to take me to Burao and I got a decent driver who charged me nothing at 
all and he was so kind to me and brought me to Burao. From Burao I begged 




Social connections also shaped routes, with people heading for destinations where 
they had 
 clanspeople or close relatives there from whom they hoped to gain assistance and 
protection, or having heard that there would be NGO assistance available. Relatively 
few of those interviewed in Hargeisa actually had close relatives in Somaliland prior 
to arrival (the Hawiye, Bantu and Reer Banadir do not traditionally live in 
Somaliland), but some more had a clansperson or an old friend there, or knew other 
people travelling there from Mogadishu. 
 
However, it is important to note that family and clan mutual support networks came 
under considerable strain, and cannot provide adequately for all those needing help. 
For example, Naema, after her husband was shot (see above), initially fled to a 
pastoral area just outside Mogadishu where her family was from, and stayed with 
them. But then the Ethiopian troops attacked the area and her sister and her husband 
were killed. After about a month she met a friend of her husband who took her and the 
children, including her dead sister’s orphans, to Afgoye. But there were a lot of 
                                                       
 
52 Focus Group 1, July 2008. Several other participants also mentioned the kindness of strangers in 




mosquitoes and the children got sick so she took them to Mogadishu, where one of 
her sister’s children was hit by a mortar. They eventually found a truck which took 
them to an area where some other relatives lived, where for several months she 
worked tending their sheep and goats, but there was never enough food. Some 
relatives gave her some money to go to Galkcayo where she found a job as a domestic 
worker until she had enough money to get her and her children on a minibus to 
Hargeisa, where she knew no one, arriving in early 2008.
53 Her experience provides 
one example of the importance and at the same time the fragility of social networks 
that often came through in participants’ accounts of the process of migration. 
 
In some ways the story of route-making is also about information and expectations 
regarding destinations. Expectations of intended destinations – of peace, helpful 
relatives, NGO assistance – are often not fulfilled, which can lead to onward 
movement. While many were content to remain in Somaliland, others had decided 
that Somaliland might not be the end of the journey – people have moved on from 
there to Ethiopia and Djibouti, and sometimes onward further to Yemen and the 
Middle East or Europe. It remains to be seen how the resignation of President Yusuf, 
the departure of the Ethiopian forces, and the successes of different elements of the 
opposition forces will affect propensity to of people in Somaliland to return to 
Mogadishu. 
Experiences on the road 
Beyond the process of moving from decision to departure and route-making, 
documenting people’s experiences of their journeys is important in its own right as it 
is often an important moment in people’s lives. While travelling, many of the 
participants were at their most vulnerable, and some described it as the worse time in 
their life. In the turmoil of the fighting, it was not uncommon for family members to 
lose each other, like Hassan and Maryan. Separation from family members could 
occur during precipitous departure, or mean that people stopped on their journeys to 
try to relocate their loved ones. One man explained that he had literally lost his 
children after his wife was killed by a rocket, and he did not know whether to trust the 
distant relatives who said they had found them in Afgoye. Another woman had heard 
                                                       
 




her eldest son who had been separated from them had made it as far as Burao and was 
trying to get money to bring him to Hargeisa. Several women said that their husbands 
had stayed behind or left for other places, within Somalia, or abroad.  
 
Some endured considerable hardship, walking for days with no or little food or water, 
and one participant gave birth under a tree to a baby boy. People also suffered 
violence on the road. One young man lost two close family member who were killed 
on the road, and another woman lost her brother who was killed by a rocket when the 
conflict came to Beled Weyne. Sexual violence on the road appears to be very 
common, mentioned by several interviewees and focus group participants who had 
experienced, witness or heard of it happen. In all, three women research participants 
were raped. Box 6 provides a first-hand account of rape by TFG and Ethiopian 
soldiers in Beled Weyne. Maryan, by contrast, did not identify her assailants. She was 
still a student in Mogadishu and her family were comfortably off because her father 
worked abroad and sent them $250 a month. In March 2007, her father and all her 
brothers and sisters were killed when a P10 [mortar] destroyed their house. She and 
her mother were out of the house at the time, and her mother lost her mind as a result 
of the shock. She went to stay with some neighbours and some clanspeople were 
trying to look after her mother, but after a few weeks they gave up and set her free and 
she disappeared. As the fighting was continuing, Maryan left Mogadishu with her 
neighbours. During that journey several armed men stopped their bus to extort money 
from passengers, and took some women, including herself. They shot two of the 
women, and they beat and raped her and then ran away. Maryan said she had wished 
she was dead but she survived, and made her way back to Mogadishu, where she 




A large number of research participants reported being stopped by bandits or corrupt 
soldiers along the way. This had long been the case, although the situation improved 
under the ICU, and significantly deteriorated under the TFG. It has been reported that 
as 2007 progressed, some drivers who because of their clan used to be able to move 
through some areas safely found that they too were increasingly vulnerable (AI 
                                                       
 




2008a). Displaced people, often carrying all their gold and cash, were like magnets for 
ambushes. Often women carried the cash secreted in their clothing, hoping that they 
were less likely to be searched, and hid their gold items in their hair. Many 
participants reported bribing their way out of a tricky situation with the various militia 
they encountered along the way: ‘I had 400,000 Somali Shillings and nothing else and 
they took that from me with other belongings. I wasn’t alone, I was with a group of 
people who came with me using the truck. We had to bribe the soldiers along the road 
to here because they said that if we don’t pay them they are going to stop us.’
55 Those 
with some financial resources were better able to pay off the bandits, militia and 
soldiers that they encountered along the way. 
 
Participants described crossing numerous checkpoints within south-central Somalia 
and Puntland, manned by a mixture of TGG and Ethiopian troops, opposition groups, 
bandits or Puntland police. As illustrated above, these were sensitive places where 
they were vulnerable to theft and assault. However, a marked contrast was when 
people passed over the disputed border from Puntland into Somaliland. Some reported 
being stopped by Puntland troops who aggressively asked where they were from, but 
let them pass once convinced that they were displaced people from Mogadishu (rather 
than spies or defectors from Puntland or Somaliland). Most of the people reported 
being stopped on the Somaliland side of the border, on the road or in Las Anod, by 
Somaliland troops, but none reported mistreatment of any kind, and all said that the 
troops had advised them to move on to Burao where they were NGOs offering 
assistance to the displaced. Experiences like this seem to have a key impact on the 
feelings about settlement in Somaliland among travellers from Mogadishu, but this 
lies beyond the scope of this paper, which has focused on causation and processes of 
migration rather than reception and consequences (see Lindley 2009). 
 
Again, there were sign of resourcefulness among travellers that helped them to 
negotiate the dangers of their journey. For example, people anticipated and tried avoid 
or accelerate through possible ambushes (in one case tricking the thieves by yelling 
that the Islamic Courts were coming just after them, which sent them scattering, 
because the thieves feared that the Islamic Courts militia might tackle them), although 
                                                       
 




this was risky in case the ambushers shot at the tyres of the vehicle. Several 
participants described themselves as particularly lucky in getting help from strangers 
– this might also be seen as a sign of their own resourcefulness and ability to 
persuade. 
 
Finally, another important factor mediating the journeys of research participants was 
travelling in groups, which helped reduce costs and risks. Some had rounded up their 
neighbours or clanspeople in Mogadishu and set off together, although their paths 
often subsequently forked. (However, a couple of interviewees chose to leave their 
neighbourhoods quietly, fearing to attract attention). Others met people along the way 
and joined forces. People often stayed alongside their fellow travellers in slum areas 
of the urban centres they reached, clustering together for some security. The collective 
experiences of having travelled from the same place and along similar routes appears 
to foster co-operation among those settling in Hargeisa. 
 
In sum, travellers’ descriptions of their journeys from Mogadishu point to several 
intervening factors - money, human capabilities, social capital and the geography of 
transport, conflict and borders. These mediated the process of migration in terms of 
the ability to depart; the timing and feasibility of travelling to different destinations, 
and the routes taken; and experiences on the road.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Migration should not be set apart from the broad array of livelihood-based coping, 
adapting and accumulating strategies that reflect the challenges of living in zones of 
dynamic and protracted conflict. This paper has explored how people who eventually 
left Mogadishu adapted to the changing structural contexts which they experienced, 
and how individuals and families reached the decision to leave, and their journeys.  
 
The approach combats a tendency to see conflict as a single homogenous event, by 
emphasising the historically changing landscapes of violence in Mogadishu, and 
focusing on a particular place and time period within the framework of a wider and 
longer civil war. What comes through particularly strongly is way that international 




– expensively - to remake the Somali state in the early 1990s, the international 
community largely left Somalia to its own devices. Within this context, people 
remaining in Mogadishu rebuilt their livelihood systems with varying degrees of 
success and security. Multiple non-state or quasi-state systems of governance 
emerged, the most effective being Somaliland, Puntland, and localised administrations 
in the central-southern regions. The Islamic Courts were the most recent of these 
systems to come to the fore, with a particularly important and, according to the 
migrants we interviewed, broadly constructive impact in Mogadishu, providing a 
long-absent level of security. However, the war on terror and western fears regarding 
the links between terrorism and failed states brought Somalia back into the 
international spotlight and heralded renewed engagement. The US government’s 
attempts to send warlords to get terrorist suspects contributed to a backlash that 
propelled the rapid ascent and expansion of the Islamic Courts Union. Western and 
Ethiopian hostility to the possibility of an Islamic state in Somalia propelled the 
otherwise impotent TFG to Mogadishu, but in a familiar pattern, an internationally-
facilitated government of national unity has failed so far to secure the city.
56 As 
Mogadishu convulsed with a vigorous and fragmented insurgency and particularly 
devastating counter-insurgency response, our research participants’ accounts suggest 
that a major shift occurred in everyday life, in terms of exposure to life-threatening 
violence, economic disruption, and widespread urban insecurity. The war on terror is 
therefore an important geopolitical key to the changing structural backdrop against 
which many have decided to leave Mogadishu in the last two years. However, it is not 
the full story when it comes to explaining out-migration. 
 
The approach taken in this paper also sought to combat the common failure to explore 
the causes and processes of conflict-related migration, by exploring through micro-
                                                       
 
56 Although regional security concerns prompted the Ethiopian alliance with the TFG, and Ethiopia has 
not been a simple puppet of US policy-makers in this respect (see ICG 2008, Menkhaus 2008), the 
Ethiopian backing of the TFG has the clear diplomatic support of the US (indeed it is hard to imagine 
that the Ethiopian government would have sent troops if opposed by its richer allies and donors) and 
the US has engaged in controversial military strikes in Somalia during the same period. At the time of 
writing, the question is whether Yusuf’s resignation and the new Obama administration may herald an 
opening for changes in patterns of internal and international relations. If so, it might be hoped that 
international actors engaging with Somalia might learn from failed attempts to obsessively remake a 
central state, and instead place more emphasis on engaging with alternative governance mechanisms 
operating in the Somali regions - as an actual and potential source of order and opportunities for 




level analysis the complex interactions between the shifting structural environment 
and different people’s capabilities and resources. Based on the accounts of migrants in 
Somaliland, how people came to decide to leave Mogadishu may best be explained 
with reference to three broad sets of factors. First, changing human resources was a 
frequent cause of migration. People’s emotional lives, their security, and their ability 
to pursue existing livelihood strategies were affected by the killing, injury or 
departure of family members. Migration experience, familiarity with specific 
destinations and personal resourcefulness and preferences also affected the process of 
migration. Second, loss of physical and financial resources also affected migration 
dynamics, according to those involved. The wholesale destruction or 
confiscation/occupation of homes, business premises, stocks and tools was often hard 
to overcome. Having ready cash was an important resource that facilitated the process 
of migration, and people often tried to converted their physical assets into cash before 
leaving Mogadishu. Finally, socio-political protection also as a result of changing 
power dynamics in Mogadishu was another important cause of migration, affecting 
physical security, with general ramifications for livelihoods, and exposing particular 
occupations to threat of violence. Social connections – specifically, the departure of 
social contacts from Mogadishu, and connections with people elsewhere – could 
encourage migration, and travel in groups was an important security device for some. 
 
Not everyone has left Mogadishu. For security reasons, it was not feasible to conduct 
research in Mogadishu, but some insights into why people have not left were obtained 
from discussions with the research participants – many of whom were recent migrants 
who had themselves remained in Mogadishu until recently. In the turbulent structural 
context, it seems that staying put may be explained by personal preference in the face 
of danger, by some obtaining reasonable socio-political protection to secure their 
means of living, by people betting their lives against their livelihoods - or it may be 
involuntary, with people locked down by violence or the lack of migration-related 
capabilities and resources (see Lubkemann 2008 and Williams 2008a). These findings 
reinforce the claim that the experience of conflict is affected by individual 
characteristics, and extend this claim to the propensity of conflict-affected people to 





The aim of this paper was to investigate how conflict causes migration, with the aim 
of contributing to a nascent ‘mobility-minded offspring of “crisis-sociology”’ 
(Lubkemann 2008: 469). The attempt to illuminate the micro-dynamics of life and 
how this leads to migration for a specific set of migrants, from a specific place in the 
Somali regions, and during a specific time-period, demonstrates that there is much to 
understand beyond the macro-political explanations frequently offered for conflict-
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British Embassy in Addis Ababa 
EC Liaison Office Hargeisa 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK 
Ministry of RRR, Government of Somaliland (Burco Office) 
Ministry of the Interior (Central Office) 
Immigration Department, Government of Somaliland (Central and 
Regional Offices) 
NGOs / international 
agencies 
 
Action Aid, Hargeisa 
Africa Educational Trust, Somaliland 
Amnesty International, East Africa 
CCPRS 
Danish Refugee Council 
Gashan 
HAVOYOCO Hargeisa and Burco 
International Organization for Migration 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
Refugee Welfare Centre (Save the Children UK) 
Somaliland Youth Development Organization 
Swiss Group  
Protection Working Group and Protection Movement Tracking Co-
ordination Group  
UNHCR Policy & Evaluation Unit, Geneva; Hargeisa Field Office; 
Nairobi Regional Office 
Voice of Somaliland Minority Women Organization 
Private sector 
 
Dahabshiil Money Transfer Company  
3 Hotels (Hargeisa) 
3 Construction Companies (Hargeisa and Burco)  
2 Airlines  
1 Rubbish Collection Company 
Other 
 
Academy for Peace and Development, Somaliland 
ARECSEMED Leadership Seminar participants 
Horn of Africa University 
University of Hargeisa Legal Clinic 
Various researchers and consultants 
 
Focus group participants 
 
Group Number  of  people  Gender 
1 5  4F,  1M 
2 4  2F,  2M 
3 4  4M 










  Group Sex  Age    Arrival  Occupation  Pseudonym 
(if used in text) 
1 S-C  Somali  F  30s  2008  Exbusinesswoman  Khadra 
2  S-C Somali  F  20s  2007  Domestic worker   
3  S-C Somali  F  20s  2007  Remittance reliant  Fadumo 
4  S-C Somali  F  20s  2007  Former student  Halima 
5  S-C Somali  F  40s  2008  Small trader  Naema 
6 S-C  Somali  F  30s  2007  Waiter   
7  S-C Somali  F  20s  2007  Domestic worker  Maryan 
8  S-C Somali  F  30s  2007  Coffee shop   
9 S-C  Somali  F  30s  2007  Unemployed   
10 S-C  Somali  M  10s 2007  Shoeshiner   
11 S-C  Somali  M  20s 2007  Unemployed   
12 S-C  Somali  M  10s 2007  Unemployed  Farhan 
13 S-C  Somali  M  20s 2007  Waiter  Hassan 
14 S-C  Somali  M  20s 2007  Unemployed  Abdi 
15 S-C  Somali  M  10s 2008  Unemployed  Jama 
16 S-C  Somali  F  20s 2007  Nurse  Safia 
17 S-C  Somali  F  10s 2008  Cleaner   
18 S-C  Somali  M  40s 2008  NGO  worker   
19 S-C  Somali  M  30s 2008  NGO  worker   
20 S-C  Somali  F  40s 2008  NGO  worker   




Ethics and issues 
 
Four core ethical principles informed the research, which were extensively discussed with the Work 
Package leader and with research assistants during the training sessions and during the fieldwork.   
 
•  Anticipating and avoiding potential harms to research participants – the kinds of risks that 
participation in the research might entail were assessed in the training workshop and were deemed 
to be minimal, provided that rights to confidentiality and anonymity were carefully observed in the 
fieldwork process and after it.  
•  Negotiating informed consent – participants were read and then given a letter explaining the 
purpose of the research, the terms and the planned output. Research assistants were given a 
checklist to remind them of the importance and ways of ensuring informed consent which they 
were required to hand in after each interview (due to illiteracy and fear, the common idea of 
participants signing an informed consent form was not appropriate) 
•  Safeguarding rights to confidentiality and anonymity – this involved the research team respecting 
the privacy of individuals by not divulging personal details to people beyond the research team. 
The team did not record interviewees’ full names in hard or soft copy notes, keeping hard copies of 
notes safely and destroying them after soft copies were made, and keeping soft copies under 
password protection. In the writing up of the research, names have been changed and details that 
could identify participants as individuals have been be omitted or changed. 
•  Safety of research team – the researcher and Work Package leader, and later the researcher and the 
research assistants discussed the potential risks that might arise from doing the research, and 
discussed ways to avoid such risks, such as working in pairs, avoiding lone-working in 
inappropriate areas, and night-time working, the importance of a clear and consistent explanation 
of the research aims, and good communication among team members. 
 
Issues arising during the research included occasional reluctance to participate, not generally due to 
fear of the authorities in Somaliland, but rather because of shortage of time and unfamiliarity with 
social research in general. A second key issue was the quality of data recording: while all the research 
assistants were enthusiastic and talented, the quality of the material collected varied considerably, 
depending on levels of skill and experience. In order to address these issues, careful individual and 
group debriefings were carried out and much of the translated notes were written up electronically in 
close co-operation with the researcher. The aim was to provide constant quality control, support and 




GLOSSARY OF SOMALI TERMS 
 
keenan out-migration   
hamar aad  literally ‘white hamar’ – term used to refer to the  
kaare tanks 
mooryaan  young freelance militia 
Qaadi  judge (sharia court) 
suno  prayer mark on the forehead 








AI Amnesty  International 
AMISOM  African Union Mission in Somalia 
ARS  Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
ICU  Islamic Courts Union 
ICG  International Crisis Group 
IDP  Internally displaced person 
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
TFG Transitional  Federal  Government 
UNHCR  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 